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The International Relations of Diplomacy

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INTRODUCTION

This topic tries to evaluate the relations and interactions of international actors in light of the need for respect to diplomacy, initial international norms and multilaterally coordinated use of force. It elaborates, on the political and economic behaviour of nations, indicated by various actors, and emphasises the desperate need for effective management of this behaviour in the international arena.

‘Diplomacy’, as stated in the Oxford English Dictionary, ‘is the management of international relations by negotiation, the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys, the business or art of the diplomats’ (Nicholson, 1963). The emphasis on negotiation is viewed by most people as the essence of diplomacy – negotiating a treaty, reaching an executive agreement, or bargaining with another state over the terms of proposed agreements. The emphasis on the state as key diplomatic actor is, of course, consistent with a realist perspective on diplomacy.

In the history of international relations, from its dawn to Kofi Annan, the realist scholars from Thucydides to Morgenthau Hans, together with their neorealist successors, insist that only states are key actors in the international arena. This

notion conflicts with the perspectives of liberalism and globalism, which assume respectively the existence of other equally important, non-state actors.

Diplomacy, in its present form, is largely ineffectual; it thus needs to be re-strengthened. Developments in science, religion, psychology, international law and various educational branches support the need for diplomacy and effective diplomatic approaches to a great range of political and social problems. These developments need to be assimilated into diplomacy. Together with this, avoiding negative behaviour by powerful actors towards universally recognized international norms, and firm belief in multilaterally coordinated use of force, appear to be indispensable stabilising factors in contemporary international relations.

The post-Cold War evolution of international relations shows that bipolarism has crumbled. Nevertheless, the world faces a rash of new difficulties. Religious, ethnic and national antagonisms have flared concurrently with the emergence of transnational problems such as the world health crises regarding AIDS, the spread of drug use, environmental degradation, the deepening gap between the very few rich and large numbers of poor people, and burgeoning refugee issues, just to mention a few. As well, since the emergence of the United Nations, with the increase in number of nations, the importance of diplomacy substantially increased as well. Currently, however, in the post-Cold War environment, the importance of diplomacy has been greatly decreasing.

As the so-called 'sole remaining superpower', in a period when superpower meaning has lost most of its meaning, the United States (US) and others face a world in which diplomacy is both less important for direct survival, yet even more vital to national well-being and long range prosperity, than any time since the American War of Independence. There is an urgent need to put the post-Cold War period in historical perspective, as well as deepen US understanding of its current, historic situation.¹ The US view of diplomacy is believed to be a mixture concerning ignorance of details, suspicion of its objectives, contempt for its importance and fascination with its romance.² This, can likely limit the capacity to generate multilateral activities.

Effective diplomacy, however, depends on the context of our knowledge of current international relations. We thus need to understand the present through assessing the past. In the ancient world, hegemony was considered most important. Order meant empire. Those within the empire were believed to have order, culture and civilisation. Outside lay barbarians, chaos and disorder. The image

¹ See also JOHN D. STEMPEL, 'Recasting Diplomacy', Nov. 1995, <http://www.uky.edu/stempel/diplomacy.html>

² See STEMPEL, Nov. 1995, <http://www.uky.edu/stempel/diplomacy.html>

of peace and order through a single hegemonic power centre has remained strong ever since. Empires, however, were ill-designed for promoting change. Holding the empire together usually required an authoritarian political style. The balance-of-power, a system of counter-balancing alliances, which was seen as the requirement of liberty in Europe, emerged as the solution to hegemony. It was successfully used to thwart the hegemonic ambitions of some European entities like Spain, France and Germany. But the balance-of-power system too, had an inherent instability, the ever-present risk of war, which did eventually collapse. At that time, diplomacy and international norms were able to avoid use of force among international actors of that period.

The modern period displays a highly interdependent world. Contemporary diplomacy, thus, requires a much more sophisticated face for the use of raw power, thereby allocating a wider role to diplomacy and international cooperation. At the same time, power, in all its dimensions, remains a fundamental aspect of international and global politics. Currently, any attempt to create an empire and vassal state around it, as a means of spreading democracy, or imposing the culture of a dominant actor upon others, is nothing less than an insult to pluralistic democracy. This chapter will focus on certain major aspects of international relations and diplomacy. Also, it will outline certain alternatives, as additional perspectives to traditional realist or late neorealist viewpoints concerning international relations and diplomacy.

The thesis of the chapter, however, is that with respect to diplomacy, maintaining universally accepted international norms and implementation of multilaterally coordinated use of force, could move the current international environment towards a world of law and peace. Reducing this dictum would create the vicious circle of imperial experience, perhaps worsening the entire problems faced by mankind at this particular period in history.

BALANCE-OF-POWER AND THE LATE IMPERIAL URGE

The last decade of the twentieth century has brought about the end of balance-of-power systems on one hand, and the waning of imperial urge on the other. These two aspects seem to go together. A world of empires in Europe culminated with all or most of them gone: the Ottoman, German, Austrian, French, British and finally Soviet empires are now no more than memory. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee preventing another imperial power from emerging, given the anarchic environment in international relations today.

In relation to this problem, Robert Cooper (2002), in his article 'The New Liberal Imperialism', indicates currently three types of states interact in interna-

tional relations: first, the remains of the traditional modern nation states, assumed to behave as states always have, following Machiavellian principles and *raison d'état* (for example India, China) – he calls these middle developed states. Second, there are newly emergent states – often former colonies – where in some sense the state has almost ceased to exist, a 'pre-modern' zone where the state has failed, thus being exposed to a Hobbesian war of everyone for themselves – civil war (for example Somalia, Afghanistan) – for developing states. Third, there are newly emergent post-imperial, post-modern states, no longer thinking of security primarily in terms of conquest concerning each other (European states), or developed states. According to Cooper, this third group of states will not see threats of imperial conquest among each other, but instead, unite against possible threats from the other group of states, in the form of 'defensive imperialism'. He asserts that all the conditions for imperialism are there, but both supply and demand for imperialism have dried up. And yet the weak still need the strong and the strong still need an orderly world; a world in which the efficient and well-governed export of stability and liberty, making themselves open for investment and growth – seem eminently desirable.

What is needed then, according to him, is a new kind of imperialism, one acceptable to a world of human rights and cosmopolitan values. We can already discern its outline: an imperialism which, like all imperialism, aims to bring order and organisation, but which rests today on the voluntary principle. The idea of creating new liberal imperialism by all means including force, at the expense of the majority of nations existing outside the 'developed few', ignores the innate aspiration of mankind for justice, democratic principles and rule of law. This new liberalism coldly sees nations of the developing world as genetically unfit for democracy; they are barbarian, therefore, values of post-modern states, seen to be representing the whole of human civilisation ('end of history'), should be imposed on them.³ This mentality does not fit international norms and efforts at multilateral diplomacy. It does not suggest appropriate solutions dealing with a range of problems facing mankind at present. It attempts to implement one-sided, non-pluralistic approaches to democracy, being unproductive in an era of international relations, with the complex interdependence of our time. This approach represents a modern surge towards imperialism in today's international relations.

POST BALANCE-OF-POWER MODELS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The fall of the bipolar system was positive, regardless of who 'won' the Cold War. Powers, in his article, 'Who won the war', points out the winner of this bat-

tle is unclear, because all countries involved in the Cold War were losers. They had to spend huge amounts of money building arms instead of investing it into society. He thus objects to the theory that the US is the 'winner'.⁴ In fact, the demise of the bipolar system has created a different world with great opportunities for actors to co-operate and move forward together, searching for a new world order instead of confronting each other. The new world order is still unnoticed. Avoiding a re-emergence of the bipolar system is, of course, positive.⁵ In this regard, President George Bush, 41st US president had this to say: 'Nobody is going to put the Soviet Union back together again. Russia is not seeking hegemony and they are certainly not seeking hegemony over the United Kingdom or the United States. So we are better off at the end of the Cold War'.⁶ Others see the future world as a multipolar one. Castro, for instance, in an interview, talks of a multipolar world in which there will be various poles including: first, the US, then Europe, Russia, China, and Japan, together with South Asia.⁷ Contrary to these aforementioned opinions, Henry Kissinger thinks the new world is unipolar, with the US as the only superpower.⁸

Even though today's international relations is believed to be beyond the balance-of-power system, a slight influence of balance-of-power is still with us. Basically, balance-of-power is a commonly applicable image in international relations, which could be invoked, according to Ralph Pittman, in three main areas: first, it is applicable as an extra-legal factor, which is a non-legal means applied previously as a traditional European effort to balance in the interests of several great powers, ensuring no single state gained dominance. This attempt was partially successful in stopping one state dominating the rest (e.g. France in the Napoleonic period, Germany in the early 20th century), but of course it did not stop wars or conflict. Balance-of-power and the dynamics of alliance systems, have been repeatedly used with real but limited success, to neutralise conflict among states (Christensen, 1997). The exists no longer in this sense. Second, it was applied regarding the superpower contest between the Soviets and US, trying to ensure one side could not militarily dominate the other. With two major coalitions or blocs (and the Non-Aligned Movement largely sidelined), it was possible to try to calculate relative gains and losses in this strategic landscape. However, with three more players, e.g. a PRC tilting between Soviet and

⁴ See POWERS, THOMAS 1996, <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/powers.htm>

⁵ See GORBACHEV, MICHAEL, <http://www.cnn/SPECIAL/cold.war/episodes/24/interviews/gorbachev/>

⁶ See BUSH, GEORGE, <http://www.cnn/SPECIAL/cold.war/episodes/24/interviews/bush/>

⁷ See CASTRO, FIDEL, <http://www.cnn/SPECIAL/cold.war/episodes/24/interviews/castro/>

⁸ See KISSINGER, HENRY, <http://www.cnn/SPECIAL/cold.war/episodes/24/interviews/kissinger/>

³ See also FUKUYAMA (1992).

US alignment, or rising powers such as India, it becomes increasingly difficult to predict outcomes and relative gains. The world no longer exists as it was. Third, to some extent, balance-of-power does exist and applies even today, with only one genuine military superpower remaining (a unipolar system). Balance-of-power concepts are often used in regional settings, often trying to prevent or balance the rise of new great powers which might upset the status quo; for instance, both Iraq and China have been viewed in this way by some analysts (Segal, 1995).⁹ China's growing strength has caused fear. Likewise, smaller or external powers will sometimes intervene to stop a great power dominating a regional system, e.g. Pakistan and China made efforts to contain or balance Indian 'hegemonic' power in South Asia (see Garver, 2001). In such settings, medium or great powers sometimes rise to challenge 'hegemony' in a particular region, or on particular issues. This means balance-of-power beyond balance-of-power.

Pittman argues, however, that with contemporary emphasis concerning economics, international diplomacy and institutional cooperation, two other key concepts are needed to help understand world affairs. The first is balance of productivity: this refers to the distribution of productive capacity, or capital in the world. The struggle for this world product, a potentially results in even or uneven balance. From this point of view, productive ability remains a real basis of power and competition. Much of world politics could then be explained by the way productive power developed in key centres, for instance Europe, the US, East Asia, or other emerging economies such as Brazil; by competition among these centres; the way other nations position themselves in the world economy, and how wealth is accumulated (see Pittman, 1991).

Alongside balance of conventional power and balance of productivity, Pittman would also argue there is a global contest of ideas, a kind of battle for the 'world mind', in which different ideologies try both to explain world history and prescribe the best path towards the future. At the time of writing, Pittman saw the main ideological approaches competing as being liberal capitalism, the Marxist approach, and a feminist reconceptualisation of world affairs arguing for a 'balance of competence', rather than just patterns of dominance/subordination.

Today, we can apply this notion concerning a balance of ideology approach, though the main players might be different. Some of the main ways of 'thinking' about the global system seem to include traditional liberal democratic conceptions, traditional approaches still concerned with state-building and government in the nation-state, approaches emphasising international financial capitalism (in a global economy), an emerging internationalist position arguing the most effective arena for action is at the level of transnational institutions (a view shared by

executives in transnational corporations and UN officials). Also, we have approaches driven by feminist, environmental and developmental concerns, trying to represent those without adequate influence in the global system, for instance the poor, women, children (see Gresh, 1998), world-views informed by religion, and a reborn socialism, which accepts market economies but seeks to moderate outcomes through progressive social policies. For instance, one may mention Social Democrats in the European context, the attempt to redefine a socialism with Chinese characteristics in China, and socialist theory derived from dependency-theory in Latin and South America as examples.

The key point is, though capitalism may have won a certain victory over communism, that alone does not spell the end of fiercely contested debates about the world system, nor does it spell the 'end of history', contrary to liberals' dreams as presented by Fukuyama (1992).¹⁰

Liberalism seems to be a dominant and triumphant world image at present. While elaborating upon liberalism in his book, Fukuyama writes '... the twin crises of authoritarianism and socialist centre planning have left only one competitor standing in the ring as an ideology of potentially universal validity: liberal democracy, the doctrine of individual freedom and popular sovereignty ... if we are now at a point where we cannot imagine a world substantially different from our own, in which there is no apparent or obvious way in which the future will represent a fundamental improvement over our current order, then we must also take into consideration the possibility that History itself might be at an end' (pp. 39-51).

Fukuyama's approach is to generate a new model of international relations based on liberalism alone. The problem with Fukuyama's approach is, on the one hand, he vigorously criticises realism (one of the world images, predominant during the bipolar or balance of power systems) for confining the pattern of history solely to bipolar systems but, on the other hand, he repeats a similar mistake himself for confining the pace of history solely to liberalism. With liberalism in place he declares, 'it is the end of history'.

According to Fukuyama, no other world image can exist in international relations. No room has been left for them since liberalism took over. To him, liberalism is the only predestined ideology, a paradigm un-triumphant for eternity. His beliefs, therefore, provide a theoretical framework for a particular group aspiring to dominate mankind, by way of imposing liberal democracy elsewhere on the globe. One can easily discern his work as underpinning the cause for 'liberal imperialism'.¹¹

⁹ See SHAMBAUGH (1994).

¹⁰ See also RALSTON (1997).

Philosophy should not reduce its task simply to approving political manipulations of a particular group, in this case concerning a universal history of mankind. Instead, it should stick to its traditional task – love of wisdom – bringing us closer to creating universal philosophy based on relative differences, like most things found in all images of life.

Realism was dominant for long periods of time in history, while at present it has been surpassed almost completely by liberalism, obviously the dominant theme currently. Presumably, globalism is next on the hit list. It is important to state that scholars advocating functional pluralistic democracy should never insist on change will occur beyond liberalism, nor state the impossibility of discerning other models of international relations.

There are several models of international relations, capable of reflecting the degree of growing harmony or deepening conflict among international actors. The most significant models include the new liberal imperialist model, the anarchic model, the co-operative model and unifying world model.

The New Liberal Imperialist Model

This is apparently a new model; neo-conservative analysts have upheld it recently. This type of model assumes the formation of empire consisting of developed nations – so called post-modern states controlling other states – pre-modern and modern, believed to be ‘naturally’ chaotic. It considers other states ungovernable, who naturally incubate threat, therefore they must be controlled. The fact that this theory relies on domination is an original and cyclical approach, leading to the vicious circle of another generational domination sooner or later. It is an extension of the remains of realism and the balance-of-power-system, manifested in its most extreme form. It relies on double standards, and a monopoly on the use of raw power.

According to these beliefs, all nations outside the empire remain in the position of vassal states. International norms are never considered; diplomacy and all actors use multilateral orchestrated uses of power as effective tools changing the world for good, yet continue with law of the jungle belief and behavior, double standards, and the individual use of force. Supporters of this type of model, for instance Cooper and Barnett, seem to divide the model into two varieties: multilateral imperialism and unilateral imperialism. The model itself is a cause of conflict as it attempts to resolve human problems largely based on use of force. The model circumvents universal norms and international governmental and

non-governmental organisations, including even the UN, when these organisations refuse to serve one-sided approaches exerted on them.

In the words of one of its proponents, Robert Cooper, the challenge to the post-modern world is to get used to the idea of double standards. Members of the post-modern world, among themselves, operate on the basis of laws and open co-operative security. But when dealing with more old-fashioned kinds of states outside the post-modern continent of Europe, they revert to crueler methods of an earlier era – force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary to deal with those who still live in the nineteenth century world of every state for itself. ‘Among ourselves’, he stresses, ‘we keep the law but when we are operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle. In the prolonged period of peace in Europe, there has been a temptation to neglect our defences, both physical and psychological. This represents one of the great dangers of the post-modern state’ (Cooper, 2002).

This model enormously affects the possibility of producing substantive democratic processes, the latter being the hope a majority of developing countries aspire to, while encouraging the spread of formal democracy designed to function as a theology of domination by liberal imperialists. This approach encompasses double standards because: the empire would likely permit democracy internally, yet deprive it externally to ‘barbarians’ dwelling outside the empire, as they are believed to threaten the empire and should be kept out by all means, including war. Likewise, Barnett advocates a unilateral model of imperialism, dividing international relations into the Core, the Seam, and the Gap, where he tells us that in the age of globalisation, to assure real ownership of strategic security, the West, spearheaded by the US, should militarily engage with the Gap: that part of the world where globalisation is thinning, or the Non-Integrating Gap, where liberal democracy is lacking, poverty and disease being widespread and, most importantly, where the next generation of global terrorists are incubated. To Barnett, Iraq is the right place to start shaping the globe.¹²

According to Norman Mailer, ‘Flag conservatives’, such as the US President, George W. Bush, and neo-conservatives in his administration, run a policy of striving for World Empire. Behind the whole push to go to war with Iraq, is the desire to have a huge military presence in the Middle East, being a stepping-stone to taking over the rest-of-the-world. Flag conservatives, who pay lip service to some conservative values, use the flag; they love using words like ‘evil’, in order to avoid narrowing their political base. They truly believe America is not only fit

¹¹ See COOPER 2002, his essay elaborates ‘the post-modern state’, here he is calling for a new liberal imperialism and admission of the need for double standards in foreign policy – an insight which outraged the left.

¹² See BARNETT (2003), as he analyzes problem areas requiring American attention, called the Gap. Shrinking the Gap is vital and would be possible only by stopping the ability of terrorist networks to access the Core via the ‘Seam states’, lying along the Gap’s bloody boundaries.

to run the world, but that it must. In going to war over Iraq, regime change, weapons of mass destruction or oil may be official motives, but the underlying motive, however, still remains George W. Bush's underlying dream – Empire. This is, in effect, moving away from democracy. To assume blithely, that one can export democracy by force into any country of his choice, can also serve, paradoxically, to encourage more fascism at home and abroad (Mailer, 2003).

The US is not just the world's only superpower; it is a hyper-power, whose military expenditures will soon equal that of the next fifteen most powerful states combined. This military and economic strength is deepening an urge towards empire. Back in 1992, a year after the final fall of the Soviet Union, there were many on the right in America, early flag conservatives, who felt that an extraordinary opportunity was now present for America to dominate the world. The Defence Department drafted a document, which Jay Bookman of The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, on September 29, 2002 described as follows: the document envisioned the US as a colossus astride the world, imposing its will and keeping world peace through military and economic power. When leaked in its final draft form, however, the proposal drew so much criticism that it was hastily withdrawn and repudiated by former President Bush, Sr. The document was drafted by Paul Wolfowitz, who was defence undersecretary for policy in 1992, and deputy defence secretary under Rumsfeld now.

This idea of global dominance was not picked up by the Clinton administration between 1992 and 2000. As a result, comments such as, if it were not for Clinton, America could be ruling the world. That document, 'Project for the New American Century', projected prematurely in 1992, following 9/11, became actual policy of the second, current, Bush administration. This administration would actively seek global dominance. The invasion of Iraq could be the first step, according to this point of view. Beyond, but very much on the horizon, are not only Iran, Syria, Pakistan, and North Korea, but also China. Writing about the war with Iraq, Bookman clearly states the war is intended to mark the official emergence of the US as a full-fledged global empire, seizing sole responsibility and authority as planetary policeman. It would be the culmination of a plan ten years or more in the making, carried out by those who believe the US must seize the opportunity for global domination, even if it means becoming 'American imperialists', the refrain which enemies of the US always claim (Mailer, 2003).

Of course, the post-modern state system in which Europeans live, does not rely on balance; nor does it emphasise sovereignty or the separation of domestic and foreign affairs. The European Union (EU) has become an example of a highly developed post modern system, facilitating mechanisms for mutual interdependence in each other's domestic affairs. The CFE Treaty, under which all parties must identify the location of their heavy weapons, thus allowing inspections,

subjects areas close to the core of sovereignty to international constraints. The shared interest of European countries in avoiding nuclear catastrophe, proves to be enough in overcoming the traditional logic of distrust and concealment. Indeed, mutual vulnerability seems to have become mutual transparency, as Europeans have common interests in terms of spreading liberal values among economic, cultural, ideological and military actors, based largely on the spread of capitalism known as globalisation. Liberalism, along with the logic of military intervention, is concerned with threats arising from other groups of states, therefore 'coalitions' directed against international terrorism, are one example of many regarding 'collective defense'.

Interestingly, there are signs of trade and military domination by a few or even one of the members of these post-modern states, for example, the domination of the US model of capitalism, trade, and unilateralism, indicating post-modern states as well being prone to new imperial urges and potential conflicts, as can routinely be observed from relations on both sides of the Atlantic.

There must be changes to a certain extent, of course, in the behaviour of states in a post-modern (developed) context. For instance, distinctions between domestic and foreign affairs, mutual interference in domestic affairs and mutual surveillance, the rejection of force for resolving disputes and the codification of additional rules, and the growing irrelevance of borders are certainly some of these changes. We also have change in addition to the changing roles of the state, through technological products such as missiles, motor cars and satellites. Security, in this new context, seems to be based on transparency, mutual openness, interdependence and mutual vulnerability, thus indicating real, positive changes in post-modern states. It also is not appropriate to deny these changes refer to some extent to states existing beyond the post-modern world. Insisting on models of segregation and barbarianization of these states, instead of embracing and assisting them in fostering changes made of their own accord, would appear to be unacceptable to history and the logic of self-determination.

The conception of an International Criminal Court is a striking example of the post-modern breakdown concerning the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs. When it comes to implementation of this norm, like many other international norms, as evidence shows, so-called members of pre-modern or modern states are not first on the list in terms of how to manipulate the International Court. In the post-modern world, *raison d'état* and the amorality of Machiavelli's theories of statecraft, which defined international relations in the modern era, have been merely replaced by a moral consciousness that applies to international relations as well as to domestic affairs: hence the renewed interest in what constitutes a just war. Here again, as recent evidence highlights, the now seen-to-be untrue reasons for going to war on the part of the so-called

post-modern world, was not that different from traditional amoral justifications – that being primarily interests, which are vastly different for all actors.

While an international system based on such a model, according to its proponents,¹³ does deal with problems that made balance-of-power unworkable, it does not entail the demise of the nation state. While economy, law making and defence may be increasingly embedded in international frameworks, and borders of territory may be less important, identity and democratic institutions remain primarily national. Thus, traditional states will remain the fundamental unit of international relations for the foreseeable future, even though some of them may have ceased to behave in traditional ways. Within the post-modern world, there are no security threats in the traditional sense; that is to say, its members do not consider invading each other. Whereas in the modern world, following Clausewitz's dictum, war was an instrument of policy; in post-modern times, it is now a sign of policy failure. But while members of the post-modern world may not represent a danger to one another, both modern and pre-modern zones do pose threats.

For Cooper (2002), the origin of aforementioned basic change in the state system, is fundamentally the source of 'the world's growing honest'. A large number of most powerful states no longer want to fight or conquer. It is this that gives rise to both pre-modern and post-modern worlds. Imperialism in the traditional sense is dead, at least among Western powers. Cooper anticipates a new kind of imperialism – new liberal imperialism, as a model that could fit the post-modern world of today, following changes in the state system. He argues European states are predominantly post-modern, and must be taken as examples that others imitate and follow. Elsewhere, what in Europe has become a reality is, in many other parts of the world, an aspiration. ASEAN, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, even AU suggest at least the desire for a post-modern environment, and though this wish is unlikely to be realised quickly, imitation is undoubtedly easier than invention. He sees only a few states outside Europe, needing to be included in the post-modern frame work.¹⁴

The other variety of liberal imperialist model is spelt out by Barnett (2003) in his article 'The Pentagon's New Map', in which he writes of a different variety of

¹³ See both COOPER (2002) and BARNETT (2003).

¹⁴ According to COOPER (2002), outside Europe, the post-modern world includes Canada; Japan – by inclination a post-modern state, but its location – geographical position – prevents it developing more fully in this direction. The USA is the more doubtful case since it is not clear that the US government or Congress accepts either the necessity or desirability of interdependence, or its corollaries of openness, mutual surveillance and mutual interference, to the same extent as most European governments now do. This evaluation of the author raises different varieties of imperial urge on both sides of the Atlantic.

imperial urge. He states, 'since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been trying to come up with an operating theory [model] of the world – and a military strategy to accompany it. Now there is a leading contender. It involves identifying the problem parts of the world and aggressively shrinking them'. He says the new world must be defined by where globalisation has truly taken root and where it has not. He argues that the pattern emerging since the end of the Cold War, and particularly after September 11, 2001, suggests the US military's next target should be the part of the world where globalisation is most weak in terms of increasing livelihoods. He calls this part of the world, the Non-Integrating Gap. This Gap, as he explains, is globalisation's 'ozone hole', contrary to the Core, where globalisation functions well. The Gap reproduces poverty, disease and chronic conflicts incubating the next generation of global terrorists. Explaining the reasons for the US led attack against Afghanistan and Iraq, he stresses the reason of going to war in these parts is not just because the leaders were evil, but also because the US is redrawing the map of the regions by shrinking the Gap. The resulting long-term military commitment, will finally force America to deal with the entire Gap as a strategic threat environment. According to Barnett, the unilateral use of force is an effective approach to shape a better world, rather than the use of diplomacy and international norms, and multilaterally coordinated use of force.¹⁵

The new liberal imperialism and its varieties, as two of its proponents have insisted, see both modern and the pre-modern states as challenges and significant threats to its security. This zone is where drug barons threaten the state's monopoly on force. All over the so-called developing and middle-developed countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and even some parts of Europe itself, there is crises and instability. No area of the world is without its dangerous cases. In such areas, chaos is the norm and war is a way of life. In so far as there is a government, it operates in a way similar to an organised crime syndicate.

The challenge posed particularly by pre-modern states is considered new. The pre-modern state may be too weak to even secure its home territory, let alone pose a threat internationally, but it can provide a base for non-state actors, who may represent a danger to the post-modern world. If non-state actors, notably drug, crime, or terrorist syndicates take to using pre-modern bases for attacks on more orderly parts of the world, then organised post-modern states may eventually have to respond in the frame of coalition or unilateral pre-emptive attacks. If they tend to be too dangerous for established states to tolerate, according to both authors, Cooper and Barnett, it is then possible to imagine a defensive imperial-

¹⁵ See BARNETT (2003); also he states that diplomacy cannot work in such regions like the Middle East, because there is major insecurity within these states. In order to build a better world, the Middle East is the perfect place where the fight must start.

ism. They see the West's response to Afghanistan, or other attacks to follow in future, in this context.

The new liberal imperialism [model] perceives the threat from the modern world as the most familiar one. Here, the classical state-system, from which the post-modern world has only recently emerged, remains intact, and continues to operate by the principles of empire and the supremacy of national interest. If there is to be stability it will come from a balance among aggressive forces. It is notable, however, how few such areas there are of the world where such balance exists today. In some areas, there seems to emerge a sharp risk of nuclear tension and miscalculation, which may cause a major imbalance in this equation.

In order to deal with both modern and pre-modern chaos, according to this largely radical, neo-conservative model, the West's, post-modern states' intervention, is thus inevitable. As to the form of this intervention, one of the ways may be colonisation as employed in the past, since the Berlin Conference of 1884, in which great powers scrambled around the globe, imposing imperial domination upon so-called third world countries. Even though the need for colonisation is as great as it ever was in the nineteenth century, today, according to proponents of the new liberal imperialism model, there are no colonial powers willing to move around the globe in the old fashion.

According to Cooper, the right form of intervention in ridding challenges of pre-modern and modern worlds being dangerous to the post-modern world, is to get used to the idea of double-standards. Members of the post-modern world, among themselves, operate on the basis of laws and open co-operative security. But when dealing with more old-fashioned kinds of states outside the post-modern continent of Europe, they need to revert to rougher methods of earlier eras: force, pre-emptive attack, deception, whatever is necessary to deal with those who still live in the nineteenth century world of every state for itself. Among ourselves, he stresses we keep the law but when operating in the jungle, 'we must also use the laws of the jungle. In the prolonged period of peace in Europe, there has been a temptation to neglect our defences, both physical and psychological. This represents one of the great dangers of the post-modern state'.¹⁶ No mention concerning the use of diplomacy or international norms to which all international actors consent.

According to the proponents of this model, post-modern models of imperialism take two forms. First, there is the voluntary imperialism of the global econ-

omy. This is usually operated by an international consortium through International Financial Institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank – it presents one of the characteristics of the new imperialism that it is multilateral.

The second form of post-modern models of imperialism might be called the imperialism of neighbours. Instability in your neighbourhood poses threats, which no state can ignore. Misgovernance, ethnic violence and crime in the Balkans, pose a threat to Europe. The response has been to create something like a voluntary UN protectorate in Bosnia and Kosovo. It is no surprise that in both cases the High Representative, is Europe. Europe provides most of the aid that keeps Bosnia and Kosovo running and most of the soldiers (though the US presence is an indispensable stabilising factor). As auxiliaries to this effort – in many areas indispensable to overall success – there exist over a hundred NGOs.

The post-modern EU for instance, according to this model, offers a vision of co-operative empire, a common liberty and a common security without the ethnic domination and centralised absolutism to which previous empires have been subject, but also without the ethnic exclusiveness that is the hallmark of the nation state, inappropriate in an era without borders and unworkable in regions such as the Balkans. A co-operative empire might be the domestic political framework that best matches the altered substance of the post-modern state: a framework in which each has a share in the government, in which no single country dominates and in which the governing principles are not ethnic but legal. The lightest of touches will be required from the centre; the imperial bureaucracy must be under control, accountable, and the servant, not master, of the commonwealth. Such an institution must be as dedicated to liberty and democracy as it's constituent parts. Like Rome, this commonwealth would provide its citizens with some of its laws, some coins and the occasional road.

This perhaps is, in sum, the vision of the new liberal imperialism's model of international relations. Can it be realised? Does this model ever work for all? Who does this kind of model work for if at all it could? In the modern world, the secret race to acquire nuclear weapons goes on. In the pre-modern world the interests of organised crime – including international terrorism – grow greater and faster than the state. In the post-modern world, there is a large appetite to dominate all other parts of the world outside the empire. In this context, a sense of humanism dies, while greed and globalisation grow. Deepening poverty, disease and social insecurities hitting large parts of mankind, are partially caused by the so-called post-modern world itself, which now tries to build a sort of ivory tower, thus securing itself by all means, including use of force to silence everything considered threatening, referring to those regions situated outside the empire.

The other two, significant models of international systems, include one envisaging the emergence of a gradually more co-operative society of nations, and

¹⁶ COOPER (2002). Both COOPER (2002) and BARNETT (2003) speak of the same topic but in slightly different approaches. Cooper supports multilateral imperialism, which only post-modern states should enjoy, based on double standards while Barnett supports unilateral imperialism of US.

the second, outlining a uniting world-system, driven by the expanding capitalist economy.

The Anarchic International System Model

This model relies on the realist vision of the international system. The realist position on this issue is obvious, as they argue for a basically anarchic international system, in which each state competes for power without a higher arbiter, or rules judging such behaviour. This view is based on a long tradition going back to the time of Thucydides, Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, and postulated by modern thinkers such as Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz (Henderson, 1998). Hedley Bull also accepts this 'anarchical society', but sees it moderated by serious efforts at international co-operation, and limited by the construction of multi-lateral organisations. One example of the application of this thinking refers to the Asia-Pacific region (see Huiskens, 2002).

Realism has displayed visible deficiencies. For instance with the Cold War, based on the balance-of-power system now deceased, the classical realist approach of defining international relations, based on this model, makes little sense. Since Morgenthau, there has been a re-working of the realist theory to account for these criticisms, called neo-realism (see Hendersen, 1998; Keohane, 1986). The latter is part and parcel of the former, but differs in that it tries to correct deficiencies of the former. Neo-realism seeks to explain the importance of super-powers and great powers in the international system. Neo-realism, also known as structural realism, abandoned the nature of human beings supposedly accounting for discord and co-operation in world politics, focusing instead on the competitive, anarchic nature of world politics as a whole. A proponent of this theory is Kenneth E. Waltz, who wrote the *Theory of International Politics*. Waltz initiated a new line of theoretical inquiry, in his attempt to systematise political realism into a rigorous, deductive systemic theory of international politics. Neorealists criticise theorists of interdependence, in that they exaggerate the extent to which great powers, including the US, are dependent on others.

Although the U.S. places great emphasis on actors such as found in NATO, or intelligence linkages with Britain, Canada, and Australia, it is also able to act in unilateral fashion, imposing economic sanctions or using considerable pressure and preponderance of power, to bring allies together in ad-hoc coalitions defending its national interest. The latest intervention in Iraq (early 2003), demonstrates the US, even if accompanied with limited numbers of active allies, is still able, alone, to reshape politics of the Middle East once again (Slocombe, 2003). By the same token, one can also think back and assert the reason why many say international relations has changed since 9/11! As the US plays the dominant role against international terrorism, this motivates its interest in reshaping world poli-

tics along this line. Neo-realists argue that international organisations often serve the interests of, or are constrained by, these powerful states. Likewise, strategic realists have also tried to build a rational case for military pre-emption on the basis of 'anticipatory self-defence'.

Classical realism, for its origin, goes back to the time of the Peloponnesian War, 5th century BC, and is associated with the ancient Greek historian, Thucydides. Classical realism influenced international relations up until the 20th century, followed by its being associated with Professor Hans Morgenthau. According to realism, fundamental causes for human developments like war and imperialism, in international relations, were no different today than in the time of Thucydides. While all other aspects of the human social environment – religion, the family, economic organisation, concepts of political legitimacy – are subject to historical evolution, international relations is regarded as forever identical to itself: 'war is eternal' (Fukuyama, 1992).

This pessimistic view of international relations has been given a systematic formulation that goes variously under the titles of 'realism', *realpolitik*, or 'power politics'. Realism, whether consciously called by that name, is the dominant framework for understanding international relations, and shapes the thinking of virtually every foreign policy professional today in the US and much of the rest-of-the-world. In order to understand the growing impact of democracy on international politics, we need to analyze the weakness of this dominant realist school of interpretation.

One of the true progenitors of classical realism was Machiavelli, who believed that men should take their bearings not by how philosophers imagined they ought to live, but by how they actually live. He taught that the best states would have to emulate the policies of the worst states if they were to survive. As a doctrine meant to apply to problems of contemporary politics, however, realism did not arrive on the scene until after World War II. Since then, it has taken several forms. The original formulation was that of pre and early post-war writers like the theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, the diplomat George Kennan, and Professor Hans Morgenthau, whose textbook on international relations was perhaps the single greatest influence by which Americans thought about foreign policy during the Cold War. Since then, there have been a variety of academic versions of this theory, such as 'neorealism' or 'structural realism', with the single most articulate advocate of realism in the previous generation being Henry Kissinger.

Classical realists such as Hobbes and Machiavelli, who upheld this type of tradition in the West, were heavily criticised by more idealist views with thinkers such as Immanuel Kant, Voltaire, J. S. Mill and Hugo Grotius. The realist tradition was only partly undermined by the evolution of co-operative democratic forms of government in France, the US, and then other parts of Europe. Like-

wise, ideal visions of a community of nations within Europe and co-operative peace among democratic states would not remain dominant, as major states competed for empire, relative power, and engaged in arms-races through the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

A challenge to the realist tradition was seen in the post-World War I endeavour of creating a more representative form of government, a model of peaceful international order, with President Woodrow Wilson's cherished efforts with regard to self-determination by national groups in Europe, and the attempt to create a genuinely co-operative international organisation, the League of Nations. It was in this period of the 1920s, that idealism held out the strongest hope for a new model of international order based on law, humanism and co-operation (see Küng, 1997).

However, these idealistic aspirations had to collapse resulting from several historical trends, such as the break down of the League of Nations system, lack of permanent solutions for avoiding warfare and/or establishing stable international order in the European state system, the collapse of democratic processes in Germany, Italy and Japan, the emergence of ideologically driven warfare and conflict, i.e. conflict driven by democratic, authoritarian, communist, neo-colonialist and anti-colonial ideas, World War II attacks against civilian populations, and the horrifying reality of genocide.

War, conflict and the development of power, emerged as the main considerations of states in the post-World War II period. This is clearly shown in the text, *Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace*, by Hans Morgenthau (1985). This classic text was republished many times, and became a standard text in many Western universities teaching International Relations, International Politics or Foreign Affairs during the 1960s and 1980s. It also came to have strong influence on practitioners such as Henry Kissinger, and indirectly on US Presidents such as Nixon.

Neo-realists, in turn, have been criticized on a number of issues. A key argument has been that neorealists overlook the dynamics of change and the quantity, velocity, and diversity of transactions in the global system today. Ethane, himself a critic of neorealism, accepts Waltz's emphasis on system-level theory and the rationality assumption regarding acts of states, as starting-points for theory in international relations (see Keohane, 1986). However, he argues that neo-realism does not explain change well. More attention needs to be paid to connections between internal attributes of states on the one hand, and the international system on the other. As we have empirically seen, sudden, unexpected change becomes one of the key features that characterize the international system since 1989, with this trend continuing through 2001-2003.

However, in the main, realist and neo-realist viewpoints about international relations have been locked in battle with idealists, who argue for laws and norms of human conduct as the basis of a civilized model of international relations; and with neo-Marxists, who search for a model of social justice in the international system, or 'new left' alternatives (see Wallerstein, 2002). Hans Küng has suggested we need to move beyond the fruitless deadlock between the 'old real politics', and an overly optimistic 'moralizing ideal politics', towards a new model of internationally responsible politics which pragmatically identifies the interests and needs at play in the international system (see Küng, 1997). Thus, instead of going over the old debates of this outdated realist model of the 'might verses right', as outlined by Thucydides, in the 5th century B.C., it would be better now to turn to other options, which apparently are better models in moving forward the international system, into more productive relations and future perspectives.

The Co-operative International Society's Model

Many would like to see a model concerning a more co-operative system of international society of nations emerge. Regimes and institutions, whether domestic or international, are the outcome of human design intended to provide an authoritative basis for regulating, or at least influencing the behaviour of states and non-state actors. So understood, the foundation of international regimes, or the development of global society, is a constructivist enterprise.¹⁷

In the seventeenth century, Hugo Grotius first postulated a community of states, basically European states at that time, which developed shared patterns of trade and diplomacy, providing a basis for international law. In the twentieth century, in particular, growing patterns of interdependence, as also traced by thinkers such as Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye Jr., suggested nations around the world were beginning to form patterns of co-operation, in which mutual needs and rights were at least partially recognized (see Henderson, 1998). For Henderson, 'people and governments are, simply, establishing networks of co-operation that meet needs that are, in turn, helping to create an international society' (1998, p. 17). Generally, these occurrences allow patterns of world governance to emerge based upon 'a broad set of rules and norms', but without formal world government.

This third model is more idealistic. The main notion of this model is that a true international community could emerge, based on the extensive development of human rights and democracy, and the development of strong supranational institutions. Most scholars would argue that such a community does not exist today. Rather, the question is whether such a community could develop in the

¹⁷ See VIOTTI & KAUPPI, MARK, (eds.), 2001.

future, especially if current co-operative trends are deepened. A true community may be a kind of utopia, but it also might impose serious restraints on diversity and place constraints on national actors.

Technology has enabled diverse peoples around the globe into ever greater and more frequent contact in economic or commercial, cultural, and social matters. As these peoples increasingly interact with each other on diverse issues, we can identify the gradual development over time of some common norms or understandings. These facts, within and across state boundaries throughout the world, have led to consensus on at least some common values, and/or preferences emerging over time. This again constitutes a culture within a global civil society that serves as a basis for constructing and maintaining international law and international organisations. The rule of law in a global civil society focuses not just on the more traditional, state-centric sectors – security, diplomacy, war and peace, and economic or commercial matters – but also on newer growth areas such as human rights, the environment, and individual standing and accountability before international courts. The idea of global civil society, however, has a long way to go, taking into consideration what has been achieved within the domestic civil societies of most states, along with enormous achievements since World War II. Still, work on this project continues well into the twenty-first century.

In the early twenty-first century, it seems that a fragile international society has evolved, but its nature and future is highly contested. This society, moreover, has not replaced the use of force as one primary method of conflict resolution, or the central role of power in international relations. Rather, traditional patterns of power are now being modified by the international system. As an example of how an international society of states has given something of a new face to the use of power, the activities of UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan appear indispensable. The failure of intrusive inspections on Iraq's weapons' programmes in 1998, is most probably one of the key steps that led to the 2003 war between the unapproved UN coalition, spearheaded by the US on one hand, and Iraq on the other (see Ferguson, 2003).

The case of Iraq can best illustrate the strength and weakness of this model. In 1998, another round of potential conflict between Iraq and the great powers of the Security Council emerged. President Saddam Hussein resisted the inspection of presidential palaces, in particular concerning US inspectors on the UN teams monitoring weapons of mass destruction. This led to a tense stand-off, in which the US seriously considered a new round of air strikes against Iraq. Three carrier fleets, 350 fighters and some 40,000 personnel were mobilized to reinforce this demand (see Phillips, 1998). Kofi Annan, as head of the UN, proposed a peace mission to Baghdad whereby some kind of deal to avoid war could be negotiated.

This proposal was strongly supported by Russia and France, which hoped for some kind of diplomatic solution. The US leadership was at first cynical of this possible solution, doubting any real deal could be achieved. However, once it emerged that the peace mission would proceed, President Clinton laid out his minimum requirements for Kofi Annan, and in fact any 'deal' offered by Annan had to operate within these guidelines to be effective.

In an intense round of negotiation with Saddam Hussein, Annan managed to return from Baghdad with a deal which met the demands of the Security Council, and to some extent that of Iraq. In spite of criticisms made of this process, especially by some Republicans in the US Congress, stating for instance, the US was subcontracting its foreign policy to the UN, 'business' had, in fact, been done with the tyrant etc. (see Liu, 1998). Annan met the basic needs of US policy, while a face-saving solution was invented for the Iraqis, therefore, in this way, the process did manage to avoid another round of destructive air strikes. This system would eventually collapse under the pressure of both Iraq's resistance to inspections, and claims that data from the UNSCOM inspection teams and surveillance equipment were being routed back to US and Western intelligence agencies (see Ritter et al., 2002).

The significance of this episode, in terms of evaluating international relations, is that serious effort was made to blend the use of power, diplomacy and international norms, though it didn't result in a manner reinforcing a co-operative international society's model due to plenty of drawbacks. The process was conducted on the basis of co-operation; it tried to meet some of the interests of several players such as US, France, Russia, Iraq, and the UN itself, but some members, namely the US and the UK, remained vividly impious, circumventing the rules of the game of the co-operative international society's model. Annan emphasized that he could offer his 'good services', but that it was not his (UN's) role to coerce, threaten, or lecture neither Saddam Hussein nor any leader for that matter. In effect, the main aim of the weapon's inspections was achieved by the use of a creative diplomatic solution, i.e. diplomats plus inspectors. The success of the mission rested largely on the dynamics between Annan (UN) and Hussein, not between the US or any individual state and Hussein. The success of the mission in the short-term magnified the need for the UN and enhanced its prestige, being desperate after the lessons of more problematic missions, where the UN was not meant to play a significant role in, for instance, Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia. Institutional interests, later, became vital. The US, thus, decided to play the international card of persuasion, backed by the threat of very real force, in spite of certain 'hawks', perhaps preferring the high political drama of immediate strikes. The co-operative international society's model had led to a co-operative end by producing the fruitful result of avoiding war. This reality remained fragile though.

There were short-term benefits and long-term problems with the outcome of this process. Kofi Annan was heard to say: 'I think I can do business with him [Saddam], and I think he is serious', leading some conservative commentators to argue that Annan had been 'duped'. Annan was also widely misquoted as saying that some of the UN inspectors acted like 'cowboys', while on the other hand giving a rather positive appraisal of the wisdom and calmness of Saddam Hussein, a view clashing with the widespread demonisation of Hussein in the West.

Annan's mission, however, secured all the points of agreement demanded by the Security Council, and therefore was a temporary diplomatic success. This is a striking example where, though for a short period of time, the model of co-operative international society's system approaches met the pragmatic needs of states, even when the possibilities of other options such as the use of power and military force were out there as well.

Moreover, the use of power and military options was financially costly. In this particular case, air-strikes against Iraq, more importantly, would have resulted in more Iraqi deaths, given Saddam Hussein more sympathy internationally, and ended on-going UN arms inspections entirely. In settling this dispute, diplomacy proved, though temporary, more efficiency, and less complicated in terms of world opinion. Polls in the US also indicated that 55 per cent supported the compromise deal, which avoided war.

The former Clinton administration reserved the right to reconsider air strikes, this time not so much in support of UN resolutions as in support of US 'national interest'. However, unilaterally launched strikes were opposed by Russia, annoyed France, and alienated large segments of the Arab world which, in the past, were willing to oppose Saddam Hussein. Here we observe a certain limited accommodation by even such a predominant power such as the US, to the workings of a fragile but real international society, wishing to see arms inspections continue rather than unilateral use of force. Others might like to compare these trends with events in Iraq of 2003.

This diplomatic method, however, could not maintain a peaceful status quo in Iraqi-Western relations. Would it work for others in the future? Regarding Iraqi-Western relations, it failed, in part, due to the discovery that UNSCOM data was being leaked back to US military intelligence, perhaps to provide future targeting for air and missile strikes (see Anderson, 1999), therefore, the inspection schedule soon collapsed. This case displays a situation in which both co-operative and power factors interacted dynamically. Iraq remained as a possible target for further intervention, both over concerns for its possession of weapons of mass destruction, and support for some terrorist groups. Saddam's possession of weapons of mass destruction was unproven, and neither was their

evidence confirm any direct connection with terrorist groups. Many insisted that Iraq is, rather, a sectarian state which is opposed to fundamentalism. These problems left open the possibility of direct intervention on the basis of unresolved claims concerning Iraq's place in the international system.

This bias formed the background, and one primary pretext for the move towards military intervention by the US and its allies, through 2002-2003. The European edition of Time magazine had been conducting a poll on its website: 'Which country poses a greater danger to world peace in 2003?' With 318,000 votes cast, the responses were: North Korea, 7 per cent; Iraq, 8 per cent; the United States, 84 per cent. As it is mentioned by Mailer (2003), John le Carré wrote in The Times of London: 'America has entered one of its periods of historical madness, but this is the worst I can remember'. Harold Pinter was also among those who strongly wrote on this theme: the American administration is now a bloodthirsty wild animal. Bombs are its only vocabulary. Many Americans, we know, are horrified by the posture of their government, but seem to be helpless. Unless Europe finds the solidarity, intelligence, courage and will, to challenge and resist American power, Europe itself will deserve Alexander Herzen's declaration 'we are not the doctors. We are the disease'.

The reason for waging war in contemporary international relations appears to be vague to many. Most great and small nations in international society, together with millions of citizens all over the planet, opposed the US lead intervention in Iraq, nevertheless, the run to war kept on, weakening endeavours of the co-operative international society's model.

The issue of finding Weapons of Mass Destruction and whether UN inspectors should be involved in confirming them, strongly believed by Russia, remains very controversial. The UN role of avoiding use of unapproved force to secure world peace, was greatly belittled for the first time in history, as unilateral behaviour kept weakening overall UN performance.

It was only later on, after this unapproved war took place, that a gradual consensus was negotiated in the Security Council, assigning special UN representative, Sergio Vieira de Mello, a Brazilian, to move and work between the UN and the Coalition, mainly a US and British administration in Iraq. His representation doesn't specify any dominant role for the UN:

The special representative post was created in the resolution to lift sanctions on Iraq and establish the authority of the United States and Britain to run the country. The Security Council adopted that (Barringer, 2003).

The Coalition committed an illegal act that defied the Charter, under which all member states abide. It is a breach of International Law in the face of peremp-

tory norms of general international law – known also as *ius cogens*, by which states are not allowed to break contract with (see Malanczuk, 1997). When the ‘coalition’ unilaterally intervened implementing unapproved use of force, we can say that on the one hand, the coalition didn’t care about the importance of UN approval. Later, when the ‘coalition’ found it necessary to endorse UN approval, to mitigate their illegal occupation of Iraq, they now needed UN approval. This highlights the significance of the co-operative international society’s model approach, and how serious problems, effecting the international system arise when this model for complex co-operative approach is suppressed or circumvented.

The other case to consider is the May 2000, UN intervention in Sierra Leone. In this case, the intervention required a complex mix of diplomatic co-operation, bargaining, and military muscle – largely based on the presence of 9,000 U.N. peacekeepers, backed up by 700 British paratroops and a strong British Naval task force. This multilaterally approved move was quite successful. This again indicates that the co-operative international society’s model welcomes multilaterally coordinated use of force, accompanied with diplomacy and international legal norms. Any attempt that undermines this approach, or unilateralism, as seen in the face of this model, seems to be the main source of insecurity and instability, witnessed through much of the international relations of mankind.

The case of East Timor, likewise, presented a successful outcome. In this case, the intervention required military, economic and diplomatic capabilities orchestrated under multilateral operations of the UN. While one can recall the way traditional power and self-image, usually derived from culture, history and ideology, have shaped key policies with major powers such as the US, Russia or France, when they intervened internationally, in this case, multilaterally orchestrated UN operations again confirm success by insisting on realistic and humanist calculations of the Timorese and Indonesians need for rapid UN intervention, rather than intervention based on a single state’s national interest or security claim.

Different visions of international systems shape the use of power, the way decisions are made, and the way societies commit themselves to various obligations. For instance, constructing the UN and abiding by its Charter and the like. Today’s international system is still viewed as anarchic, i.e. without central authority or without a final moral arbiter, but not amounting to chaos, yet (Pietrzyk, 2001). The current, partly anarchic system of international relations, can be modified through partial implementation of norms, the creation of institutions, and a deeper understanding of the way conflicts can be regulated. These constructions are in age mental, cultural, symbolic, and institutional. They channel wealth, power and human invention into the international system. The judicious use of

power, both economic and military, needs to be balanced by a long-term view of the costs of humanitarian and military intervention.

The Unifying International Society’s Model

Another approach regarding the perception of international relations today, has been the one envisioning global processes based on the world-system theory. The unifying international society’s model, seeks a world-system whose unity is driven by the expanding capitalist economy. This approach turns away from aspects like classes, ideals, and balances in order to look at the world-system as a whole. This is related with another current global image – globalism/socialism. One of the key proponents of this idea has been Immanuel Wallerstein.¹⁸ Wallerstein, contrary to those who think a world system has emerged since the 20th century, makes important distinctions by stressing it’s having evolved over the last four centuries:

... A world-economy, capitalist in form, has been in existence in at least part of the globe since the sixteenth century. Today, the entire globe is operating within the framework of this singular social division of labour we are called the capitalist world-economy (Wallerstein 1984, p. 13).

World-system theory based model, classifies the world into three main parts: the leading core – the first or developed world, the peripheral areas – the third or underdeveloped world, and the semi-periphery – industrialising but having lower wage structures and being less technologically developed. He argues that the leading core includes industrialized nations that are prone to exploit resources in the peripheral areas due to the dominant main stream position they occupy in international politics; thus prone and capable to exploit resources in peripheral areas from those which are pushed away from the main stream international political system to the position of resource suppliers. This are so designed in order that the capitalist system could perpetuate. In effect, the structure of the world-economy permits ‘unequal exchange of goods and services, such that much of the surplus-value extracted in the peripheral zones of the world-economy is transferred to the core-zone’s. The world is now linked by ‘commodity-chains’ that usually cross national boundaries, and on which most business activities and people are now directly and indirectly dependent. From this point of view, states and the inter-state systems remain largely the political expression of the world-economic system. The author so defines and characterizes the unifying international society’s model, which is based on the expansion of capital and how it’s not producing for much of mankind.

¹⁸ See AXFORD, 1995; ROBERTSON, 1992; VIOTTI and KAUPPI (eds), 1999.

He goes on to argue there are long-term cycles in the world economy, in which growth, boosted by expansion in supply of goods and products, is followed by periods of stagnation or bottlenecks. In these periods of stagnation, there are pressures on the social system and productive system, which would include reduction of production costs – followed with mechanisation and finding cheaper labour in the periphery. Also, creation of new ‘core-like’ activities based on innovation, leading to new areas of investment and high profit; intensified class and political struggle among and within core states, with strengthened demands by workers in core states and elites in periphery zones; expansion of the outer boundaries of the world-economy, largely based on rapid development in the core and underdevelopment in the periphery nations. Ironically, even in mixed aid-and-trade regimes between rich and poor countries, net monetary flows can still flow from the poor to the rich nations, largely based on payment of extended debt (see Dowrick, 1989).

In such a system, even here and only rarely, can core states establish hegemonic control of the world-economy for brief periods, for instance the UK, 1815–73, and the US 1945–67. These processes have also lead to the emergence of a worldwide middle class, reliant on the capitalist system and supporting a modernised culture into which other cultures tend to have been assimilated through market forces.

In so far as this system tends to dominate production, trade is the boundary crossing having dominant access to communications and technology; it also tends to create ‘a cognitive global order’ (Axford, 1995). It then seems ‘natural’ that science should progress, that technology should always be better, faster and natural, that liberal capitalism, based on privatisation, will create more wealth for ‘most’ of the core community. Opposition to this scheme, whether based on religious, cultural, socialist or political resistance, therefore is readily seen as either utopian or retrograde. The new ‘geoculture’ in turn is usually represented as progressive, humane in a realistic way, and able to deliver increased prosperity. Failures of the system, either in terms of ecology, continued poverty, market instability or limited patterns of democratisation are either ignored, consigned to ‘future development’, or labelled due to national mismanagement. Hence, Asian economic failures through 1997–1999 have sometimes been dismissed as entirely based on ‘crony-connections’, yet not remotely based on instabilities in the global financial system. Likewise, there has been a tendency to dismiss Latin American financial crises, for instance in Mexico and Argentina, as simply based on corruption, poor political leadership, and some vague Latin American ‘cultural traits’. Although these factors have been involved in crises over the last decade, they were also compounded by vulnerabilities in the flow of global capital, portfolio investment, and instabilities as countries tried to peg or unpeg currencies.

However, according to Wallerstein, the current world-economy has expanded almost to its outer boundaries, incorporating most of the planet. He therefore argues that this world-system is now undergoing a stage of slow systemic crisis. Today we might see this view as dated, but it has become clear through the 1990s that capitalism has had to diversify and change its methodologies to remain viable, and that there may be no inherent, automatic stability in the international financial system (Soros, 2002).

Trends in the global economy do suggest that unifying international society’s model has emerged, as world-system, based on economic forces developing since the 16th century in Europe. These forces in the past were channelled through major trading cities such as Venice, Amsterdam, London and, in part, through emerging mercantilist European empires such as the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, French, and British companies and interests (Braudel, 1986). The process, however, is far from complete since segments of the world population remain outside the ‘global culture’, while others suffer from uneven globalisation. It is this very incompleteness that allows for continued civilisational dialogue and negotiation over rules and power sharing in the international system.

One may raise legitimate questions like whether the system is really in crisis, and whether it can, in fact, expand further. Will there ever be a ‘balance of civilisation’, or would economy arrive at balance or equilibrium? Can the proposed new global geoculture meet human needs beyond consumerism and the need for information and entertainment? If not, will new institutions and cultures have a chance to emerge? Is it possible for the global system to expand while disintegrating substantial populations, i.e., the poor? Will there be increased resistance against the world system by local groups, individuals and institutions who are negatively affected? Would diplomacy effectively resolve conflicts that arise within the existing world-system? Is the core’s rushing to war an attempt to secure the world capitalist system or, effectively to advance, elsewhere, liberal democracy, modernisation, and freedom? Isn’t this imposing the American model of capitalism on the rest of the world? Are we doomed to only this model?

Several critics of this model and many other thinkers like Wallerstein, perceive the international system today in crises. There is no doubt, for instance, a crisis of violence, misery, repression, and the environment. As to the root cause of these crises, the supporters of this model may see various reasons like the problem of resource access, price, culture (Huntington, 1996), and population as the root cause. The critics of this model, including Wallerstein, insist the root cause of these crises is primarily an improper world system – the capitalist model itself with its uneven structure (see Galtung, 1984).

According to critics of this model, concerning the problem of violence, arms control and proliferation policy at macro and micro levels, have already been tried. Regarding the reality of misery, we have tried transfer of technology, along with capital and social structure transfer, known as 'aid', yet later as 'cooperation', also being applied. For the problem of price, international conferences to 'stabilize prices' have been tried. For the problem of repression, there is the whole national and international system of legal norms, adjudication, and possible administration of sanctions. For the twin problems of depletion and pollution, recycling constitutes a typical solution, and for the population explosion problem, there is, of course, family planning and birth control. 'All of these have been tried' they say, 'we don't want to belittle those solutions but in reality what has been changed?' They see aforementioned solutions as only symptom curing, with the root problem still there, even increasing; they argue that the system itself is the root cause; hence, it seeks a political solution.¹⁹ Harrington, for instance, asks himself: 'Am I, then, saying that the capitalist North is imperialist? As a matter of American political rhetoric, the answer seems to be, no. As a matter of serious theoretical analysis, the answer is yes'.

America is the key nation in a planetary economic system that, in good times and bad, reproduces the relation of domination and inferiority that are so dramatically visible in the North-South gap. The system was founded between the sixteenth and eighteenth century, based on the bloody process of capital accumulation, including slave trade and pillage. Later on, in less dramatic developments, the capitalist economies deepened and institutionalized their original advantage by means of the world market of the nineteenth century. The content of that structure [capital driven unifying model] persists to this day, even though there have been many changes in form' (Harrington 1984, p.72).

EVALUATING THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Various scholars have attempted to evaluate the behaviour of nations in the international arena, with regard to relations such as political, economic, cultural and the like. This process of evaluating the behaviour of different nations does not take place in a single uniform way. One of the major reasons for this is the difference in world image, between scholars who deal with this field.

Images, however, are not theories. They are spectacles through which one can see the world and its perspectives. They not only contribute towards a better

understanding of international politics or political economy but also help generate theory. There are at least three such major world images: Realism, Pluralism/Liberalism and Globalism/Socialism. The relation between these images and how far their teachings conflict or can be applied in the modern period of a highly interdependent world, becomes crucial.

As for their relations, one can observe the existence of some common ground among them. But, in many ways they conflict and their assumptions are, thus, incompatible. For example, realism assumes that states are unitary international actors who speak with one voice and act rationally. Pluralism assumes, on the other hand, that states are not unitary actors like single physical beings, acting with a single mind being totally rational, while globalism asserts patterns of dominance, dependency relations between North and South, and that southern nations are not strong enough to advance their national interest, therefore, states alone cannot be considered international actors. Such visible incompatibility has affected the possibility of generating a global philosophy with various, competing aspects. The concepts of human rights, terrorism, globalism, imperialism, for instance, do not have universal meaning applicable in every situation.

Realists largely examine the balance of power, pluralists transnational process, and globalists, patterns of domination. These different topics require not only the use of different levels of analysis, but also conflicting assumptions. Meanings are often incoherent, the same term being defined in different ways, incompatible with one another. The term imperialism, for instance, has been defined by Morgenthau as a reverse of the power relations between two or more nations. Whereas to Lenin, it is just the highest stage of capitalism.

Robert Keohane and John Ruggie (realist and pluralist), both argue in attempting to construct a theory of international relations, that one must begin with the realist emphasis on power and the state. But, structural analysts (globalists/socialists and neorealists, who both insist on the importance of systems, thus also known as structuralists), and scholars such as Immanuel Wallerstein and Kenneth Waltz, stressing the importance of systems, provide critical context by which pluralist insights and actors are to be analyzed.

Notwithstanding the apparent inconsistency of earlier images, recent work also defies easy categorisation with just one image. Such work is being done, in sociological institutionalism on hypothesis concerning common global culture, which compete with those of realism and pluralism. Elements of social constructivism and institutionalism can be found not only in realist and pluralist or neoliberalist but also in globalist scholarship.

These three images remain a durable guide to theoretical work in the field of international relations. It would be good step to search for the root of realism, liberalism and globalism, as a global philosophy to unite humanity.

DIPLOMACY AND SOVEREIGN STATES

Since the 15th century, with the emergence of sovereign nation states in Europe, states have started paying attention to the ways and means of diplomacy or communicating with each other with regard to security concerns, and the conduct of relations among them in both war and peace. Diplomatic relations are established by mutual consent between the two states concerned. However, they may be broken off unilaterally (often as a mark of disapproval of an illegal or unfriendly act by the other state); when one state withdraws its diplomatic mission, it also requires the other state to withdraw its mission from its territory. The receiving state may at any time declare a diplomat *persona non grata* or not acceptable, thus forcing the sending state to withdraw him. This is a step which can be employed as a sanction, if immunities are abused (see Malanczuk, 1997).

As positivism emerged in international law in the 18th century, it regarded the actual behaviour of states as the basis of international law emphasising the theory of sovereignty. According to the doctrine of positivism, only states have unlimited rights to wage war, enforce claims or protect national interests.

The sovereignty of state covers the right to exercise complete jurisdiction within its own territory, as well as be independent or autonomous in conducting foreign policy or international relations. On this basis, states are legally equal regardless of their size, economy or power in international relations. This is the source of legal equality that sovereign members of the UN and other international organisations enjoy right up to the present, as stated in Article 2, Section 1 of the UN Charter, the 'Organisation is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members'. Diplomatic representation has served as customary international law over long periods of time, until it finally came together with other rules governing diplomacy, specified formally as treaty obligations in the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations in 1961 and 1963, respectively. Diplomacy primarily remains the domain of states and international organisations made up of states. States can assign diplomats or wage war, or call upon the UN Security Council, but non-state entities or individuals cannot.

Since its emergence in the thirteenth and fourteenth century, modern diplomacy has been a primary means by which states attempt to exert influence over other states. With the development of the modern state system, dating from the 16th century, it took its contemporary narrow meaning: managing the foreign af-

fairs of states at the government level.²⁰ It is used to avert war, to resolve a crisis, or to negotiate a peace settlement. These are the main responsibilities besides the lower-profile activities of diplomats which include the daily work conducted at embassies and consulates: issuing tourist and immigration visas, providing citizen services for overseas travellers, encouraging commercial activity among nations, and regular meetings with host foreign ministry personnel. Diplomacy, whether applied in varying ranges including mild mutual negotiations or moderately coercive or coercive approaches, is thus used to find mutual gain as a basis for agreement. An approach whereby, one party, due to its political, geographic, economic, technological, military, social, cultural dominance gains and the other loses, is not a solution. Diplomacy and its uses, in the sense of finding mutual gain as basis for agreement, in the present international environment seems dormant. It is not, however, completely dead.

CONTEMPORARY DIPLOMACY AND THE USE OF FORCE

Contemporary diplomacy, unfortunately, seems to lean deliberately towards satisfying the interest of only one party, probably due to dominant abilities that party possesses. In today's environment, where capabilities among the states involved diametrically differ, the dominant party will have leverage to conclude bilateral agreement with individual states coercing the unwilling party. In such cases, all governments will not have a common interest in seeing an agreement reached, but would be forced to consent with the interests of the dominant party even though these interests do not match their expectations. Generally speaking, false pretexts will appear to be reasons for waging war or taking any serious measure against a weaker state. Even in those situations in which states' preferences are close enough to be reconciled and the parties involved desire achieving a mutually beneficial accommodation, non-coercive diplomacy will play a major role in achieving productive outcomes.

Threatening to use force is a prevalent aspect of diplomacy, if it is used skillfully within a frame of multilateral diplomacy. Such threats are not designed unilaterally, but on the bases of consent of the international community, to get other states to do what they would not otherwise do – compel them to take particular actions. This approach, which is often termed coercive diplomacy, may vary from economic sanction to the use of military force. Threat of force when wisely applied, can also be an aspect of deterrence – a way to persuade states from doing what they intend or might like to do. No one is quite as competent as the UN in applying this use of force in today's international environment. Any attempt by

individual states to threaten force diminishes respect for democratic principles and trustworthiness among members, and would lead, in effect, to more unmanageable chaos and breaches of international norms rather than strengthen norms binding relations of actors.

In the process of the development of modern diplomacy, the Congress of Vienna (1814-15) holds great historical importance. It displayed a collective hegemonic state system – the Concert of Europe. As studies confirm, diplomats of that time attempted to establish a successful international system that was capable of mitigating the worst aspects of anarchy among states. Necessary adjustments were made to the European order – the balance of interests and power, which contributed to the avoidance of major war and supported stability in Europe until this system and its diplomatic mechanism fell apart in 1914. The Vienna Congress must be remembered because it was a record of successful multilateral diplomacy, where a number of countries communicated and negotiated over the most contentious issues to attain co-operative ends.

Successful multilateral diplomacy depends, however, on accommodating the interests and specific objectives of not only two states, as in bilateral diplomacy, but also a larger number of participants. As mentioned above, any kind of domination or reluctance to stick to the rules of the game will reduce the utility or functionality of international institutions in multilateral diplomacy, leading perhaps to their ultimate collapse.

Compared to the success of the Vienna Congress, the Versailles Peace Treaty following World War I, as a multilateral diplomatic settlement, lasted only two decades. The multilateral diplomacy that followed World War II proved to be much more successful, though marked by periods of high tension due to East-West competition during the cold war. Nevertheless, multilateral diplomacy in international conferences, and within international organisations has assumed an increasingly important role in world politics since 1945. More recently, multilateral diplomacy has been dealing with demographic, environmental, economic development, humanitarian issues and the like.

Once other sovereign states recognize a population living in a defined territory administered by a government, under international law a sovereign state thus comes into existence. This recognition of a state's sovereignty is basically intertwined with its internal and external claims. The internal claim refers to a right as a sovereign state to exercise complete jurisdiction over its own territory free of interference by other states in its domestic affairs except in exceptional cases when the use of military force or coercive intervention for humanitarian reasons or otherwise becomes inevitable, after multilaterally approved and applied under UN auspices.

The highest legal attempt in human history regarding prohibition of the use of force, has been stated in Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, which provides:

All member states refrain in their international relations from the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state ... This rule is of Universal validity; even the few states which are not members of the UN, are bound by it because it is also a rule of customary international law.

A unilateral right to use force to intervene for humanitarian reasons or otherwise in other states, is illegal in view of prohibition of the use of force in the UN Charter. The legality of the use of armed force or other compelling coercion by third states as a response to severe human rights violation in other states – right of humanitarian intervention, has been abused in the past by strong states to pursue other political, economic or military objectives. The question of intervening to adopt peaceful measures or protect and implement fundamental human rights is unclear, and has not been decided by the International Court of Justice, nor has the International Law Commission answered it in a definite sense (see Malanczuk, 1997).

This kind of imprecision is the biggest defect in modern rules. Practice has done little to reduce such imprecision. Many states, instead of moving towards precision and correcting defects, want to retain the possibility of using force in certain circumstances, but they know that an interpretation which allows them to do so would allow other states to use force against them; so they 'keep their options open' by failing to adopt a clear attitude towards the problem of interpretation (see Malanczuk, 1997). This, in effect, generates a vicious circle of crises leading towards undermining the crucial importance of international institutions such as UN.

Practically, powerful states do not always respect the sovereign claims of other states. When they choose to unilaterally interfere in the domestic affairs of another state, the response may well be a diplomatic protest note or public declaration to the same effect. For instance, during the bipolar international system, the US privately and on occasion publicly condemned Soviet policies for violating human rights of its citizens, particularly Jews, who were not permitted to leave the country. The Soviet response at the time was to condemn the US for unlawful interference in its domestic affairs: Soviet emigration policy in Moscow's view was a domestic matter and not the business of the US. The official American position was that the Soviet Union had obligations under international law to respect the human rights of all people and should not try to exempt itself from international scrutiny just because it was a sovereign state. This row was, of course, jeopardized by ideological differences, which was subject to their superpower competition. These superpowers glared at each other in what became known as

the Cold War, bringing international relations to the brink of doom's day – where all would perish and nobody win, if war broke out between them. Multilateral diplomacy was not in a position to help avoid the threat of war, for it was manipulated and abused by one or the other side's veto, causing mutually co-operative ends to be near-impossible to achieve. Eventually the decaying system fell apart.

In another example, which is more serious because a state had committed aggression against another state. We can observe Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, which took place soon after the fall of the bipolar system, in 1990. In this case, Iraq's behaviour was considered an act of aggression by most states, which refused to recognize the legitimacy of Iraqi claims to Kuwaiti territory. The government in Baghdad asserted, of course, that Kuwait was not legitimately a state in the first place, since it was created as an artefact of British colonialism. Quite apart from the fact that control of Kuwaiti oil fields was also at stake, Iraq maintained that Kuwait was really Iraqi property that it had rightfully retaken by force. Other states rejected Iraq's efforts to extinguish Kuwait as a sovereign state. They formed a coalition under United Nations auspices to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and restore control to the Kuwaiti government then in exile. In this case, we observe that when diplomatic efforts failed, military forces of a broad coalition of states drove the Iraqi armed forces out of Kuwait in 1991. This is witness to the effectiveness and prevalence of multilateral diplomacy, which is occasionally needed to coerce a wrongful state over its unilateral, largely unproductive use of force.

A current example to be considered is the invasion and occupation of Iraq, in 2003, by the coalition composed unilaterally of the US and Britain, representing another precedence of circumventing multilateral diplomacy. Many sources confirm this invasion was absolutely illegal referring to the preamble of the UN Charter – the shared law of our planet, still in place – which states: 'We the peoples of the United Nations, determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of method, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims'. The first article of the Charter says that the purpose of the UN is to 'maintain international peace and security' and to suppress 'acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace'.²¹ This UN material is directly counter to the arguments of the US and UK leaders, who showed an extraordinary appetite for rushing to war. It is illegal to start a war of intervention without a UN mandate, and without the authorisation of any

²¹ See CARREL, S. & VERKAİK, R.: 'War On Iraq Was Illegal, Say Top Lawyers', *Independent*, 25. May 2003

legitimate international body. This easily presents the US as the aggressor in this case.

There was no possible juridical basis for this outright intervention of Iraq, which amounts to a war of aggression. We speak about the recent position of the US towards the UN, wanting to weaken the strong position of the UN at the expense of NATO.

Lawyers attempting to vindicate these groups, do not find similar examples in recent history. According to Lobe, some international lawyers, such as Yale University's Ruth Wedgwood, have claimed that the previous resolutions gave Washington adequate legal cover to unilaterally enforce disarmament, and precedent for circumventing the Security Council was established when Washington and NATO allies launched their air campaign against Serbia in 1999 without the Council's authorisation.²² But the situation in former Yugoslavia was more critical, contrary to the case of Iraq; that situation witnessed the consent of most states in support of military intervention.

According to the UN Charter, there are only two possible options in which one state can use military force against the other. The first refers to individual or collective self-defence – a right under customary international law, which is expressly preserved by Article 51. The second is under Article 42, where the Security Council decides that use of force is necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security, where its decisions have not been complied with.²³ But the US and UK leaders' inducement to the world about the necessity of war because of dangers of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, none of which have been found, doesn't meet any of the conditions to wage war. 'The mere fact that Iraq has a capacity to attack at some unspecified time in the future is not enough' (Starmer 2003, p. 3). It is difficult to believe that Iraq could directly jeopardize the USA and the UK.

Many international lawyers argued about illegalities of the war against Iraq. Carrel and Verkaik write about this by quoting a prominent international lawyer, Prof. Sands, who publicly warned Tony Blair that the war was illegal, and that it raised two major issues: 'first, did the Security Council authorize the use of force, the answer to that is no. And [second] were we misled about the presence of weapons of mass destruction? Apparently, yes. These things are going to come back to haunt us' (Carrel and Verkaik 2003, p. 4).

²² See LOBE, J., 'Law Groups Say US Invasion Illegal', March 2003, <http://www.commondreams.org/headlines/03/0321-10.htm>

²³ STARMER, KEIR, 'Sorry, Mr. Blair, but 1441 Does Not Authorise Force', *The Guardian*, March 2003, p.3.

The US-led invasion of Iraq violates the basic rules of the UN Charter requiring countries to exhaust all peaceful means needed to maintain global security before taking military action only in self-defence. Except for a very small number of states, most states are not even keen on contributing towards the reconstruction of Iraq, in the aftermath of the war without the key role of UN.

Today, many international groups insist the war is unjust and the continuing conflict unlawful. 'The two groups, the US affiliates of the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANS), together with Canadian international law professors, have recently released an open letter that called a US attack against Iraq 'a fundamental breach of international law that would seriously threaten the integrity of the international legal order that has been in place since the end of the Second World War.' Such an action 'would simply return us to an international order based on imperial ambition and coercive force' (Lobe 2003, p. 1), according to them. The fact that a country like the US, which calls itself an old democracy presenting itself as a leading example of liberal democracy, yet not respecting international law, raises the question will there ever be willingness to reinforce the rule of law at an international level? Could not such behaviour evoke other attacks between other nations?

President Bush tried to connect Iraq and its leaders with terrorism and al-Qaida before he publicly apologized for this incorrect connection. Writing about this, Ramonet states, 'It seems that since the attacks of 11 September 2001, the US under president Bush, has arrived at a cynical definition of proper behaviour by governments. Bush and his staff have thus decided to take action which is against morality, human rights and international law'.²⁴ Therefore many people think that Bush does not respect elementary human rights. This is against everything that America has been saying it has stood for.

The lives and property of civilians requires tight protection as much as possible. A measure of collateral damage is permissible only in the case of legitimate military action. According to Delphy, a growing chorus of world legal authorities have declared that intervention which defies the UN Charter is totally illegal.²⁵ In this case, civilian deaths are simply considered a war crime. 'Any failure to protect civilians would be a violation of the 4th Geneva Convention. Article 55 of this Convention obliges that the occupying power must secure the civilian populations' basic needs, guarantee their fundamental rights to care, education, freedom of movement and settlement. Wherever the occupying power fails to respect or assure respect to these rights, it will be guilty of a serious viola-

tion of the Geneva Convention, and such a violation is considered a war crime" (Delphy 2003). Therefore presently, US soldiers in Iraq are in a dubious situation, strongly disliked in the eyes of Iraqis. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has the power to bring to trial individual soldiers and their commanders if there is evidence that a war crime has been committed against civilians, for instance if they fire on civilian rioters.²⁶ Therefore states want to protect soldiers against punishment of the ICC by invoking their own law. Washington invokes bilateral agreements to immunize Americans from ICC scrutiny. 'So long as Washington resists that oversight, even for crimes committed in countries that have ratified the ICC treaty, European governments should collectively refuse to shield Americans from transfer to The Hague. No European Union government has yet acquiesced, but Britain, Spain and Italy have blocked a common EU rejection'.²⁷ The US attempts to spread new rules, which only satisfy its own interest along this line.

The alleged weapons of mass destruction, which carries the greatest possibility of legally justifying this use of force under International Law, have still not been found in Iraq. Lobe on this point quotes another prominent expert, Anne-Marie Slaughter, who argues that while technically illegal, Washington's decision to take military action without the Council's backing might still be legitimate (Lobe, 2003). The problem here is to prove the existence of alleged weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. According to Lobe, Washington could still gain UN approval if its forces found 'irrefutable evidence that the Iraqi regime possessed weapons of mass destruction' (Lobe 2003, p. 5). Not many people, however, now believe any of those alleged illegal weapons are in Iraq or will be found there.

IS THE WORLD SAFER NOW?

Since the end of what was known as the bipolar world, international relations do not appear to be moving in a direction where all actors benefit from current international realities. Diplomacy, international legal norms and multilaterally coordinated use of force, which would have contributed to establishing a better world, appear to have been greatly undermined.

The world is, some argue, waking from a liberal dream of global harmony to the reality of chaos and conflict. The theory of peace, promising global stability into the future following the Cold War, at this moment appears to represent un-

²⁴ RAMONET, IGNACIO, 'Lawless War', *Le Monde Diplomatique*, April 2003, p.6.

²⁵ DELPHY, CHRISTINE, 'International Law and the Humanitarian Crisis in Iraq', 2003, <http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=15&ItemID=3332>

²⁶ ROYLE, TREVOR & MACKAY NEIL, 'Soldiers Fear They Are Acting Illegally', August 2003, *The Sunday Herald*, p.3.

²⁷ ROTH, KENNETH, 'Allies' Post-war Panic Puts Justice in Jeopardy', August 2003, *International Herald Tribune*, p.5.

warranted optimism. Mearsheimer, in his article 'Why We Will Soon Miss The Cold War', points to the fact that the end of the Cold War may lead to trouble, especially in Europe. Untamed anarchy – Hobbes's war of all against all – by which Europe behaved before the Cold War – is a prime cause of armed conflict. This, in turn, may turn Europe, as the violent conflict of 1990s Yugoslavia witnessed, back to where it was before 1945.²⁸ To some, the end of the Cold War means just the beginning of another kind of conflict. In his interview with CNN, for instance, Gorbachev indicated, 'Now we've got the expansion of NATO. There are suspicions about who threatens whom, and the average person asks: 'why should NATO be revived'? It appears the US is attempting to change its strategy – veering instead toward the military path. This is an attempt to take advantage of the situation at a time when Russia is weakened, when Central and Eastern European states are weakened, and all are busy with reforms – because NATO wants to fish in murky waters. So the geopolitical struggle has obviously started again: the struggle for resources, for regions of influence'.²⁹ Today, the potential for global growth is in question. Peace is in danger. There is fundamental concern now about the limits of required growth, and a feeling that the way we now live is unsustainable.

The US still remains predominantly optimistic, but in Europe in particular, including Britain, opinion surveys show almost half the population losing their faith in progress, without even mentioning developing countries, the so called 3rd world or South, where progress and its philosophy are in deep crises. Material living standards may be rising, but very large numbers of people no longer believe the world of tomorrow will be a better place in which to live.

It seems more and more obvious the source of this pessimism is the cumulative impact of key factors such as: pressures of population growth, the pressure of urbanisation, water shortage, environmental challenges, the quality of the air we breathe, the pollution of oceans, the loss of species as habitats are violently transformed, along with substantial evidence of a fundamental change to the climate caused by human activity.

Sustainability is about the environment and biodiversity, but there are other factors as well. There are problems related to world politics and international relations, problems of peace and security, poverty and the like.

The pressures created by a world in which global markets without global norms operate, portray a world without certainty – except of course the certainty

of change. We've entered a world where national cultures and the credibility of democratic institutions are challenged by great competitive pressures globally.

The imposition of a globalised economic model, without fostering legal norms to improve the anarchic international environment, finds humanity surrendering power to massive corporations, keeping poor nations poorer because they are 'only' raw-material suppliers. Effective management of power and influence internationally, remain a deep concern. Any attempts to generate global legal norms, binding on all international actors, is completely lacking in the current international environment. The idea of universal 'civilisation' seems to run without universally accepted rules in place. International relations of this shape and kind will not generate policies by which effective change comes to the lives of billions who live in extreme poverty domestically, and elsewhere. An environment of anarchy is a condition under which powerful actors apparently secure their interest, while smaller entities live in enormous fear, insecurity, and despair. This allows such despair to continue spreading as a means of global control by the powerful.

Diplomacy, universally accepted norms and multilateral-based uses of force are not allowed to work in coordinated fashion for the satisfaction of mankind's basic needs. Vital international norms functioning as linchpins, upon which peaceful relations between actors are achieved, are being seriously eroded. For instance, certain great powers defy principles of peaceful resolution of conflict along with international treaty obligations as well, when they do not agree with their own narrow pursuits. Instead, they prefer to insist on extremely dubious and controversial forms of logic, such as accepting the idea of unilaterally approved forms of pre-emptive attack being implemented whenever suitable to them.

Concerning the dominant belief surrounding free markets and free trade, in reality they do not yet truly exist. The simple idea that people should be free to trade with each other in peace is obviously a positive doctrine, but current realities indicate it only promises riches to everyone, but delivering to the few. Not only are consumers of the wealthy West exploited, there is also the growing welfare state, weakening democracy, despoiling of the environment, and entrenched poverty in the third world. This much is already clear. In addition, many now believe the mantra of free trade and free markets are nothing more than a utopian scheme for global ideological conquest. Regarding this very point, Stiglitz, in his book *Globalization and Its Discontents*, points out that in order to make globalisation more human, effective and equitable, the primary actors, i.e. the international economic and financial institutions, not yet democratic, should reform themselves first before they tell others to change (Stiglitz, 2002). Otherwise, they can hardly claim to be democratic promoters and protectors. Pointing out the danger to democracy, he warns that current globalisation seems

²⁸ See MEARSHEIMER, JOHN, J., 'Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War,' 1990, <http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/foreign/mearch.htm>

²⁹ See GORBACHEV, MICHAEL, CNN Interview, September, 1997 <http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episods/interviews/gorbachev.htm>

to replace old dictatorships of national elites with the new dictatorship of international finance. Countries are told if they don't follow certain imposed conditions, the capital markets or the IMF – as public institutions, will refuse to lend them money. They are basically forced to give up part of their sovereignty by 'disciplining' them, or telling them what they should and should not do. All these desperately poor countries don't have another choice, therefore, they must accept these numerous policies imposed on them, against their better judgement and preference.

Contemporary diplomatic practice is also undoubtedly under great pressure, resulting from global trends of interdependence and crises of authority. Power is the basic tool of international politics. The way in which this power performs at international levels, matters a great deal (Shively, 2003). Its distribution between various actors such as states, governmental and nongovernmental organisations, and their level of participation in forming choice and collective decisions internationally, seem inevitable as steps leading to a better world concerning any and all actors. The process of reaching international decisions in ways we know as diplomacy, must focus on effective ways satisfying not just a few, but the many. It is in diplomacy rather than military action, that most activity by international actors takes place. The use of power in diplomacy, like the use of power in any other sort of political activity, may run the full range from persuasion to coercion.

Diplomacy, however, seems to be senseless and unproductive, concerning attempts to achieve effective international outcomes, if other entities are forced into only accepting the interests of dominant actors being imposed on them. In this setting, diplomacy thus appears as nothing more than a great deception in the eyes of most of the rest-of-the-world. This can only lead to vicious circles of imperial dominance and hegemony, providing no solutions thus preventing humanity from witnessing a safer, newer mutual world of international relations.

CONCLUSIONS

To sum up, the use of diplomacy, international norms and multilaterally orchestrated use of force, must represent contemporary international relations implicitly, if the world is to move forward. Key questions like the role of force in international relations, and the relationship between force, diplomacy and ethics demands all actors offering careful and appropriate evaluation of the global condition. Also, cross-cultural studies have come to the fore as religious, ethnic and national issues move up the world political agenda. For instance, the US and Europe have had to face the issue of whether or not all fundamentalist movements are inherently hostile to basic American values, and how best to deal with them in alternative ways. International actors need to work cooperatively, to be able to

achieve their common goals. As a vehicle of achieving this goal, they need to uphold effective models of co-operation, allowing them to see the role of the UN reinforced, rather than diminished.

We should also consider transforming the UN on the normative level, into an effectively functioning universal organisation, reflecting the collective wishes of all humanity. It's very structure, hitherto being largely open only to loyal individuals, should now assume more professionalism regarding employees and skilled diplomats. Actors must do more to improve the organisation into a dynamic and creative one, where individuals are devoted to purposes as opposed to bureaucratic tendencies and aspirations of securing pensions.

A significant endeavour to look at the development of the UN, and educate the public about its purpose, requires awareness of the changing international environment and the expanding importance of the UN, not only for local, state, and national affairs, but mainly for the international system. There is merit in this enterprise, not just the result. Such an attempt will be successful, of course, if it is cast across the broadest possible spectrum and accompanied by an effective intellectual revitalisation of the subject. More efforts should be given to improving the UN, otherwise the planet will likely move into ever larger areas of chaos.

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